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Universidad de Chile 
Resumen: El propósito de este artículo es encontrar condiciones 
suficientes bajo las cuales los resultados del modelo 
simple de búsqueda se mantengan después de introducir 
un proceso de aprendizaje. Se demuestra que estas 
propiedades se mantienen bajo supuestos más bien 
simples. De manera intuitiva, lo que se necesita es que 
el agente no tenga expectativas "explosivas". 
Abstract: The purpose of chis paper is to find sufficient conditions 
under which the results of the simple search model are 
preserved when learning is allowed. It is shown that the 
properties of the simple search model are preserved with 
very simple assumptions. Intuitively, we need a "non-
explosive" agent. That is, expectations must be smooth. 
1. Introduction 
The simple search model has been useful to analyze different problems 
in many areas of economics (for example, see Lippman and McCall, 
1976, and 1993). However, the stationary assumption (in the simple 
search model all time dependent variables are held fixed) is too strong 
for some applications. 
Several efforts have been made to study the behavior of a searcher 
under a non-stationary environment, in particular, to obtain condi-
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tions under which the results of this model are the same than those of 
the simple one (Rothschild, 1974; Rosenfield and Shapiro, 1981, and 
Bikhchandani and Sharma, 1990). These authors have shown that if the 
search process follows some specific rules (a specific updating process, 
or a particular offer distribution) the results of the non-stationary model 
replicate those of the simple one. The objective of this paper is to show 
the role of expectations in this case. The results of stationary search 
models are preserved if it is assumed that agents have "non-explosive" 
expectations. Also, a very simple (practically naive) updating process, 
compatible with this required characteristic of expectations, is presented. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the search 
process is presented. In section 3 the non-stationary search model is 
developed. Here I find out the conditions under which the results of the 
simple model are preserved. Conclusions close the paper. 
2. The Search Process 
To describe search I will use the R&D investment decision. The reason 
for doing this is that here a non-stationary approach is more adequate, 
R&D is basically a learning process. The firm that invests in R&D learns 
about new products or processes. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume 
that it follows a search process with learning, i.e., a non-stationary. 
The objective of the searcher, a firm in this case, is to obtain the 
highest value of an innovation. To achieve its objective the firm invests 
dollars, a fixed amount, in an R&D project at the beginning of each 
period. At the end of it the firm knows with certainty the "value" of the 
new (improved) good or process, which is called pt> 
The "value" pf is the net present value of the future cash flows 
associated with the technology at its current stage.
2 At all periods the 
firm observes the current offer pf 
! In a different approach the firm does not know with certainty the value of the 
project. See Lippman and McCardle (1991). 
2 The NPV is net with respect to the production costs of the new (improved) good or 
the variable costs of the new (improved) process, not net with respect to the R&D costs. THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS  105 
It is assumed that the firm can adopt any innovation at zero cost. 
This implies that the firm adopts all innovations with a value higher 
than the one of the current technology. Then ^ is defined as the best 
offer after t periods or, equivalently, the value of the technology being 
used. Note that ^ is no -decreasing.
3 If /?f>^„, the firm adopts the 
improved technology at its current stage. However, to decide whether to 
continue the project, the firm compares the best value of the innovation 
so far (y with the expected net value after investing (searching) 
another period. Thus, there are two comparisons to be made; pt against 
%t and the expected value of search against ^. Every period in which the 
value of the innovation is "large enough" the new (or improved) 
product or process is adopted. However, only when ^ is larger than the 
expected value of search the firm stops the R&D project. As noted 
elsewhere, in the stationary case this search policy exhibits the reserva-
tion value and myopic properties.
4 
The reservation value property means that to decide whether to 
stop or not the searcher compares her options with a benchmark 
value. The myopic property, on the other hand, means that the best 
value is compared with the expected value of the innovation in the 
next period, net of search costs. That is, the searcher behaves as if 
only one period remains. 
3. Adaptive Search 
As stated above, the simple search model assumes that all time dependent 
variables are held fixed (the stationary assumption). In this section I will 
show that if we relax this assumption there are no effects on the predic-
tions of the model, if some restrictions are .added. Other authors 
(Rothschild, 1974; Rosenfield and Shapiro, 1981, and Bikhchandani and 
Sharma, 1990) reached at the same conclusion. This paper adds to 
their results in the following sense: even with very simple restrictions 
3 It>,+ i > %, then , =p, +1, and if pl+, < then , = therefore \l+ , > 
4 Lippman and McCall (1976) and Reinganum (1982), among others, show that 
when recall is not allowed these properties hold. It is well known that in the stationary 
case the recall assumption is innocuous, therefore in the recall case the properties mention-
edinthe text hold as well. 106 KSTUDIOS FCONOMICOS 
(almost naive) the results of the simple search model are preserved. This 
means that it is robust enough to the attempts made to construct more 
"realistic" models. 
Following Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981), the crucial element to 
prove is that the adaptive search model must have the reservation value 
and myopic properties. If these two characteristics of the simple model 
are preserved, the comparative static analysis follows through. 
In the stationary case it is assumed that the-.searcher knows the true 
distribution function of the offers, and it is fixed. Here it is assumed that 
the firm does not know the true offer's distribution function. However, 
it holds some beliefs that are updated every period. Also, it is assumed 
that the true distribution function is constant over the R&D process. 
That is, the value of innovation in period t, Pf is a non-negative random 
variable with unknown cumulative density function. The searcher has 
some beliefs about the distribution in t, F(> and the latter is updated 
every period. This assumption implies that the relevant distribution, 
the one that the searcher uses, is not constant anymore. Therefore, the 
search process is non-stationary. 
It is assumed that Ft depends on the previous offers, i.e., F = 
F( P/1 p), with p being the vector of previous offers, p = (pv pT pt_ ,). 
Therefore, the searcher updates its prior after each draw. The assumed 
updating process is quite simple: every time the current offer is better 
(worse) than the value of the in-use technology, the whole probability 
function moves to the right (left). That is, if the searcher observes an 
offer below ^ at t+ 1, then the posterior distribution is dominated by 
the prior stochastically in first order. This implies that the expected 
value of search decreases every time a worse offer is observed. On the 
other hand, if the searcher observes an offer higher than ^ at t + 1, then 
the posterior distribution dominates the prior stochastically in first 
order. Then the expected value of search goes up (this is in the spirit of 
Bikhchandani and Sharma, 1990). 
In order to have a finite search process, it is necessary to assume 
that the expected value of search increases less than the value of the 
in-use technology (^), at least after some time, whenever a good draw 
occurred. That is, it can be the case that at the beginning the expected 
value of search increases mores than ^. However, as time goes by the 
expected value of search must increase less than ^, to have a finite 
process. Note that there is no requirement for the bad draws. In this THK ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS 1 07 
case ^ does not change and the expected value of search decreases. 
Thus, the probability of stopping increases. 
With the structure already given, it is possible to state the problem 
more formally. At period t the firm has to decide whether to continue its 
R&D project or not, when the best value of the innovation is ^. Here the 
Bellman equation that defines the problem is 
r
M 
(E,p) = max{E, = -c + Pj V(p ,p')f(j, \p)dP (1) 
m 
where M is the highest and in the lowest value that pt . , (the realization 
of Pi+f) can take, and p' represents the vector with one more offer. Note 
that there are two state variables, the value of the in-use technology (^), 
and the vector of previous offers. Note also that the distribution function 
that the searcher uses includes the information given by the observation 
of the f-th offer. 
I will first show that the optimal policy is myopic and then that it 
can be characterized by a reservation value. The difference with Rosen-
field and Shapiro (1981) is the restriction imposed to guarantee these 
two results. 
For simplicity I will call the second part of the integral in (1) as 
<p, + the net expected value of search. That is, 
.M 
m 
Following Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981), the myopic property 
holds if the one period ahead looking policy is optimal. If only one 
period remains the searcher will stop (continue) if the best offer so far is 
larger (smaller) than the net expected value of searching the last period. 
That is, stop (continue) if the following holds: 
M 
>(<)-c + p| max(£ /? ,)/(p , I p)dpt+v (3) 
m 
where in general, for oo periods remaining, the rule is to stop (continue) 
if the following inequality holds: 
.M 
t>(<)-c+$j V(pi+1,pO/(p,+ |lp)4P,+ 1='<P,+ i- (4) 1 08 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981) prove that it is sufficient to have the 
net expected value of search decreasing with extra observations, for the 
myopic property to hold. In Proposition 1 it is shown that if cp,+ , in-
creases proportionally less than \, then the myopic property'holds. 
Therefore, this requirement is less stringent than the one demanded by 
Rosenfield and Shapiro. 
PROPOSITION I: If 3tp; + | / 3cj; < 1 then the myopic property holds. 
PROOF: Let's check the stopping rule first. Then assume that ^, > cp, + ,. If 
this is the case and given the hypothesis, + , > <pf + 2 holds and therefore 
the searcher will also stop at t+\, with certainty. This implies that 
v( P, + l > P') = max(£,, pt+x), and therefore 




-c + pj V(pt+vp)f(pi+l\p')dpt+l . (5) 
The first inequality is the one period ahead looking rule, which says 
"stop". The second one is the °o periods ahead looking rule, which also 
says "stop". Therefore, the myopic stopping rule is errorless. 
To check the continuation policy, assume ^ < tp;+ Here the sear-
cher will not stop at t, and maybe not even at r+1, therefore 
V{pt + ,, p') > max(£(, pt + ,). This implies 
M 
,<-c + pJ rnax(^ p x),f{p , I p)dp 
in 
M 
<-c + pj V(pi + vp')f(P(+l\p)dpt+l (6) 
m 
Again, the first inequality corresponds to the one period rule, which says 
"continue", while the second one corresponds to the «, periods rule, 
which says also "continue". Therefore the myopic continuation rule is 
errorless and it is verified that the myopic policy is optimal. • 
The next step is to prove that with the same assumption about the 
relation between the expected value of search and the value of the in-use 
technology, i.e., 9(0 , /3E < 1, the optimal policy is reservation. THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS  109 
PROPOSITION 2: //3q>r+ , /d^, < 1 then the optimal policy is reservation 
in terms of the best value so far. 
PROOF: At the beginning of the search process £0 = 0 and <pj > 0, then the 
first positive offer is accepted, thus making %x=pl. Given that 
a<p,+ , /3£f < 1, the best value so far and the expected value will cross 
only once. After that point the searcher will stop, the expected value 
(q>, + I) will be smaller than the best offer so far • 
Thus, the searcher compares this period offer with the best value so 
far. If the former is larger, then the offer is accepted. Also, if the best 
offer so far is larger than the newly computed expected value, the search 
process stops. 
Therefore, I have shown that if the expected value of search in-
creases proportionally less than the reservation value, the two desired 
properties are preserved. The searcher cannot explode in optimism (pes-
simism) after a better (worse) offer arrives, to have the desired proper-
ties. If this is the case, the simple search model is suitable to analyze 
R&D. Moreover, as seen before, this assumption also guarantees that 
the search process is finite. 
Now it is time to show a case under which the condition 
d(pf + , < 1 holds. That is, to present an updating process compatible 
with a "non-explosive" agent. To do so it is necessary to be more 
precise on the updating process. It is assumed that if pt = ^t_t±s, 
then Pt + {=Pt± 41(f), where Pf is the random variable at t. That is, the 
distribution moves at most by s. Also, to assure convergence it is as-
sumed \L' < 0, [1(0) = 1 and |i(°°) = 0. That is, the searcher puts in-
creasing weight in the prior, as time goes by. 
PROPOSITION 3: If the optimal policy is myopic and reservation, and 
if the updating process is one such that ifpt = ^t_{+s (pt = ^ _ , - s) 
the searcher believes that the distribution moves to the right (left) at most 
bys, thend^tJrX'/d^t<\ holds. 
PROOF: Here it will be shown that the expected value of search changes 
less than the improvement of the reservation value (best offer), under the 
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Given that the best offer is non-decreasing the relevant case is when 
^ = Pi = S( _ j + s. Under the updating process described in the text P t + , 
dominates Pt in first order. That is, Pf f, />. : vui/). with every pas-
sible realization pl + ]=pt + s[i(t). By assuming the myopic and reserva-
tion properties, equation (2) becomes 
.M 
9; = - c + pF3/ _ , F(^t _ , I p) + p J ptf{pt I p)dP/ (7) 
and 
.M 
© .=-c + PS F(E lp') + P P . Ip'Vfo ,. (8) 
Equations (7) and (8) imply 
(p . = - c + p£ , ! p) + p.vF(£ I p') 
+ Pj P,f(Pt I P)^ + PXOD - I P')]- (9) 
1 
These equations imply 
%+l=%+ pJln(0 - H(f) F I p') + I p')] < cp/ + s, (10) 
given that p < 1 and [|i - \iF + F\ < 1.
5 
Therefore, in this case the expected value of search increases less 
than the improvement in the reservation value. That is, 3(p/+ /d^< \ . m 
Note that if a "worse" offer is observed £( is not affected, but <p;+ { 
decreases. However, this does not affect the reservation value and myopic 
properties. Let /?, = £,_,- s. Then, the value of the technology in use 
(the reservation value) does not change, 5, = 5(_ ,. Therefore, 
(pf + j = (p(- p4i(i)[T - F(^ I p')] >%-s, (11) 
5 Note that [a. - uf + F] < 1 <t=> F(l - u.) < 1 - u /•' < 1. On the other hand, 
fp - uF + F] > 1 « F(l - a) > 1 - u <=* F > 1, wich is not feasible. THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS  m 
given that p < 1. Therefore, the expected value of search decreases less 
than the worsening of the offer. 
Therefore, for any distribution function I have shown that it is 
possible to generate a "non-explosive" agent with a sensible updating 
process. Moreover, this special case seems a sensible process for R&D, 
because any time a "better" offer is observed the searcher believes the 
distribution is a "better" one. However, after several draws the informa-
tion given by the actual observation is smaller (it may be only a lucky, 
or unlucky, draw), thus allowing for convergence. The updating process 
may appear "naive" as well. This is good, because it shows that it is not 
necessary to assume specific distribution functions and complicated 
updating processes to keep the reservation value property. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper shows that the properties of the simple search model are 
preserved with very simple assumptions. Intuitively, we need a "non-ex-
plosive" agent. That is, expectations must be smooth. Moreover, it was 
shown that this smoothness can be achieved with a very simple updating 
process. 
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